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Abstract 
 
In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the 
cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains).  
To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with 
three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on 
profits.  Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the 
prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form 
(deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed 
penalties in all welfare-relevant respects.  For the other three types of penalty we show that, for 
those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those 
based on profit)while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in 
conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that 
penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform 
those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) 
average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Cartels are still very active throughout the world and pervasive in a wide variety of 
markets - despite increased enforcement in the form of much higher fines and other 
sanctions and the implementation of leniency policies. Empirical evidence reviewed in 
Levenstein and Suslow (2011, 2012, 2014) also suggests that, while antitrust is the most 
important force leading to cartel break-up, there are limitations to the effectiveness of 
these policies as currently designed.5 In this paper, we argue that the widely employed 
current designs of one of the most important enforcement tools in the fight against 
cartels– namely monetary penalties are flawed and that this does indeed limit the 
effectiveness of this tool.  We propose an alternative design that could significantly 
improve the effectiveness of monetary penalties. Specifically, our objective is to set out 
the welfare economics framework that supports the case for Competition Authorities to 
switch the base on which penalties for cartels are set away from the conventional bases of 
revenue or illegal gains and instead to base the penalty on the cartel overcharge.  Our 
reason for choosing to examine this alternative penalty base is that, consistent with the 
prescriptions of second-best welfare economics, this policy is targeted at the underlying 
distortion generated by cartels – the increase in price.6 
To make this case we examine various penalty regimes that have been widely 
considered in the literature and analyse their impact on: (i) the price charged by any stable 
cartel that forms;  (ii) cartel stability/deterrence – i.e. the number of stable cartels that 
form; and finally  (iii) the overall level of welfare induced by the penalty regime.7 We 
characterise a penalty regime by (a) its toughness – the probability of detection and the 
penalty rate; (b) the penalty base to which this penalty rate applies.  
We use a repeated Bertrand oligopoly model that allows us to compare both the price 
and the deterrence effects of the four major types of fining structures investigated in the 
literature. These four types are: fines based on revenue (see e.g. Bageri et al. (2013) and 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013)); fines based on illegal gains (see e.g. Harrington (2004, 
2005), Houba et al. (2010, 2012) or Hunold (2013)); fines based on cartel overcharge (see 
                                                 
5 See in particular the recent series of papers by Levenstein and Suslow (2011, 2012, 2014) that contain 
reviews and extensive references to the relevant literature.  
6By contrast the alternative penalty bases – revenue or illegal gains/profits – while also depending on the 
cartel overcharge also depend on the cartel output, which in turn depends negatively on the cartel price thus 
diluting the incentive to lower prices.   
7The impact of the toughness of the penalty regime on the cartel pricing behavior has been addressed in 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013). However, they have relied on a static game, have not analyzed the impact of 
the penalty structure on cartel stability and have not examined the deterrence implication of the various 
penalty structure employed in practice, as we do here. In his seminal article, Harrington (2005) has also 
shown that price dependent penalties (that are based on damages) imply that the steady state cartel price will 
be below the simple monopoly price and that the toughness of the penalty regime (the size of the damage 
multiplier) is one of the factors that reduce the equilibrium cartel price. However, he does not provide 
comparisons of all the alternative penalty regimes examined here. Also, and most importantly, the possible 
deterrence effects of various penalty structures in conjunction with their direct price effects have not been 
systematically analyzed in literature on antitrust so far. 
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e.g. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013));and fixed fines 
(see e.g. Rey (2003) or Motta and Polo (2003)).  
While other papers have considered the properties of each of the four penalty regimes 
and made some limited comparisons between them, a major contribution of this paper is 
to undertake a systematic comparison of all four regimes in terms of their impact on both 
the prices set by those stable cartels that do form and deterrence/cartel stability (i.e. the 
number of stable cartels that form).  
We also make two important methodological contributions.   
 First, we extend the repeated Bertrand model in Houba et al. (2010, 2012) to capture 
the effect of the cartel stability condition on cartel pricing behavior. In particular, 
since we have cases where the cartel price may be above the monopoly price, we 
have developed a more general model of the price-setting behaviour of a defector. 
This allows us to bridge the standard critical discount factor approach to the analysis 
of collusion (see e.g. Tirole (1988) or Motta and Polo (2003)) to profit maximizing 
decisions by the stable cartels (with continuum of prices, which can be chosen by 
the cartel). This latter approach has been proposed in e.g. Block et al. (1981) or 
Harrington (2004, 2005).   
 Second, we provide a framework within which we integrate the impact of penalty 
regimes on the price setting behaviour of cartels that do form with their deterrent 
effects and this provides an evaluation of the overall impact of different penalty 
regimes.   
Our first result is that the class of profits-based penalties is identical to the class of 
fixed penalties in terms of all the welfare-relevant outcomes they produce – price, 
deterrence.  Anything that can be achieved by one type of penalty can be achieved by the 
other using an equivalent level of penalty. Consequently we confine attention to three 
penalty regimes – those based on profits, those based on revenue, and those based on the 
cartel overcharge.   
In terms of the price set by those stable cartels that do form, we show that proportional 
fines based on overcharges are more successful in terms of their effect on price when 
compared to fines based on revenues or illegal gains.8 Specifically, we show that: 
 penalties based on illegal gains lead cartels to set the monopoly price – however 
tough the regime; 
 if the penalty is imposed on revenue then: (a) the cartel price will be above the 
monopoly price;(b) the cartel price will be higher the tougher the regime; 
 if the penalty is imposed on overcharge then: (a) the cartel price will be below the 
monopoly price;  (b) the need to maintain cartel stability requires the cartel to set its 
price at or below a maximum price which decreases towards the competitive price as 
                                                 
8Apart from the trivial case where either the probability of detection or the penalty rate is zero, in which 
case there is effectively no penalty regime and it does not matter on which base the non-existent penalty 
might have been based.  
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it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain stability; (c) the cartel price will be 
lower the tougher the regime.  
Turning to the deterrence impact of different penalty structures, we show that, as 
expected, in each regime the tougher the penalty the greater is the degree of deterrence.  
A major contribution of this paper is to combine deterrence effects with an analysis of 
the prices set by those cartels that do form to provide an overall assessment of the impact 
of different regimes on prices, consumer surplus and total welfare (consumer plus 
producer surplus).  But since both deterrence and the cartel price can depend on the 
toughness of the regime, it follows that in order to meaningfully compare the effects of 
using different penalty bases we need to ensure that each penalty regime is in some sense 
equally tough.9 We consider two concepts of equal toughness.   
The first is deterrence equivalence:  the same fraction of all stable cartels that could 
potentially form do in fact form.  Given the above results on the prices set by cartels that 
do form, it is clear that under deterrence equivalence penalties on the overcharge out-
perform those on profits which in turn out-perform penalties based on revenue.   
However competition authorities – and courts – are not concerned solely with 
deterrence, they also want penalties that are reasonable and proportionate.  So the second 
criterion of equal toughness that we consider is that of penalty revenue equivalence:  on 
average10 the size of the penalty actually paid by any cartel that forms and is subsequently 
detected and penalized should be the same.  We again demonstrate that in terms of 
average overcharge, average consumer surplus, and average total penalties on the 
overcharge out-perform those on profits which in turn out-perform penalties based on 
revenue. 
Currently the revenue-based penalties is the norm in all major jurisdictions with caps 
that are based on either revenue (EU) or on illegal gains (US).Most other OECD countries 
follow the lead of the US11 and the EU12. 
                                                 
9As we will show, achieving a given level of toughness under a revenue based penalty regime requires the 
penalty rate to vary according to the elasticity of demand in the industry.  An estimate of this can be obtained 
by the use of what Farrell and Shapiro (2008) have proposed in the case of mergers through the application 
of Critical Loss Analysis: “revealed preference information (to) make inferences about preferences based 
directly on observed choices”. Here, and to paraphrase their argument in relation to mergers, “one can make 
inferences about demand sensitivity as gauged by …real firm(s) based on (their collusive) choice of price…. 
The idea is captured by the Lerner equation”. 
10Since, as indicated, the price set by any cartel that does form under both a revenue-based penalty regime 
and an overcharge-based penalty regime will potentially vary depending on the intrinsic difficulty of holding 
the cartel together, so too will the actual penalty paid.   So all we can require is that on average the penalty 
paid should be the same.   
11In the US the process of their assessment begins with the calculation of a base fine. To determine the base 
fine, a percentage of the volume of affected commerce, that is, of total sales from the relevant market, is 
taken into account. The USSG suggests that 20% of the volume of affected commerce can be used as a good 
proxy. This volume of affected commerce covers the entire duration of the infringement. Once the amount of 
the base fine has been calculated, aggravating and mitigating elements are taken into consideration. 
However, the final fine for undertakings must not exceed a maximum statutory limit which is the greatest of 
100 million USD or twice the gross pecuniary gains the violators derived from the cartel or twice the gross 
pecuniary loss caused to the victims. 
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Our clear policy recommendation is therefore that Competition Authorities should 
switch to a penalty structure that uses the price overcharge as the base on which the 
penalty is imposed.13 In essence the reason is that overcharge based fines are preferable, 
since they target the price, which is causing the damage to consumers. Profit based fines 
are a weaker instrument since they do not target the price directly, but target firms’ 
earnings, while revenue based fines have strongly counterproductive effects as originally 
also shown in Bageri et al. (2013) and Katsoulacos and Ulph(2013).   
Overcharge-based fines are superior to currently employed penalty regimes at not just 
a theoretical welfare-economics level. It is likely that implementation of overcharge-based 
fines in practice is no more difficult than the next best alternative (in terms of welfare 
induced) – a profits-based penalty.14 Although establishing the counterfactual can be 
tricky, competition authorities have to obtain estimates anyway during the investigation in 
order to establish whether a group of firms really has driven up the price.  And certainly 
such information is needed in order to obtain estimates of the overcharge, during damage 
claim procedures - developments in economics and econometrics make it possible to 
estimate cartel overcharges with reasonable precision or confidence.15 We further discuss 
implementation issues below. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. In Section 
3 we derive the main formulae for pricing, deterrence and various welfare indicators 
under each of the penalty regimes. In sections4 we undertake a systematic comparison of 
the various regimes in terms of prices, deterrence and overall welfare.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
12In the EU under 2006 guidelines, fines are calculated in the following way: First, the Commission 
determines a basic amount which may be adjusted afterwards due to aggravating and mitigating elements. 
The basic amount is calculated by taking into account the undertaking’s relevant turnover (of the last year of 
the cartel), the gravity and the duration of the infringement, as well as an additional amount of about 15% - 
25% of the value of sales in order to achieve deterrence. For cartels, the proportion of the relevant turnover is 
set at the higher end of the scale which is 30%. However, the maximum amount of the fine imposed shall not 
exceed the cap of 10% of annual worldwide turnover of the undertaking in the preceding business year.See 
also 2006 EU Guidelines and Bageri et.al. (2013). 
13 It is important to note that in this paper we are concerned solely with the question of which of the various 
alternative penalty bases is superior in terms of its welfare implications and not with the different issue of 
whether current cartel penalty rates are or are not too high. There is an extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature on this latter question which is reviewed, for example, in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013).  Their 
results support the recent evidence by Allain et.al (2011) and Boyer et.al (2011) that current rates are not too 
low and indicate that higher rates (on a revenue base) will not necessarily lead to lower cartel prices. 
14Bageri et. al. (2013) provide additional arguments to those presented below for preferring a profit-based 
penalty regime to a revenue-based regime (they do not consider an overcharge-based regime). 
15For details see Brander and Ross (2006). 
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2. The Model 
 
In each of infinitely many periods, 2n  firms compete in prices in a homogeneous 
oligopoly model with demand function ( )Q p where p denotes price and Q is the quantity 
supplied to the market. The associated inverse demand function is denoted ( )p P Q  and 
is assumed to have the standard property that both average and marginal revenue are 
strictly decreasing. Firms have identical constant unit costs of production , 0 (0)c c P  . 
We make the standard assumption that there are no efficiency effects from cartels and so 
firms’ unit costs, c, are the same whether or not they are in the cartel. 
We denote industry profits when the price is p by ( , ) ( ) ( )p c p c Q p   . The 
monopoly price associated with particular demand function and cost level c is denoted as
( ) arg max ( , )M pp c p c , where, given our assumptions, ( ) (0)Mc p c P   and ( )Mp c  is 
strictly increasing in c. The associated monopoly profits are denoted by 
 ( ) ( ) ,M Mc p c  where ( )M c  is strictly decreasing in c. 
The important implications of this set-up are as follows. Firstly, in the absence of 
collusion, the competitive equilibrium would be the unique Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in 
which all firms set price at marginal cost, so  and 0N Np c p  . Np is sometimes 
referred to as the “but-for” price – the counterfactual price that would have arisen in the 
absence of collusion. We also let  N NQ Q p  be the associated “but-for” level of 
output. Secondly, if a cartel forms then, in order for the cartel to be able to set a price 
above Np , all n firms have to be in the cartel. 
We model the cartel as an infinitely-repeated collusive game supported by a simple 
grim trigger strategy profile, but in the presence of antitrust enforcement.16 In every 
period, the n symmetric firms decide whether to collude and, if so, at what price. If the 
firms collude at price p c , gross collusive (cartel) profits will be ( ) ( ) ( )p p c Q p   .17 
So long as firms are colluding, then, with constant18 probability , 0 1   , in each 
period the CA may detect and successfully prosecute the cartel, in which case it imposes 
a penalty at the constant rate 0   on a penalty base ( )B p , which, as indicated, may 
vary with the price. Since our focus is on the effects of different penalty bases, we 
assume that both   and     are independent of the price, p, set by the cartel. We let 
   denote the toughness of the penalty regime. 
                                                 
16Several elements of this model are borrowed from the analysis in Houba, Motchenkova and Wen (2010, 
2011, 2012). 
17Given our assumptions, these will also represent the illegal gains from collusion – cartel profits minus the 
profits in the “but-for” situation. 
18The assumption of a constant probability means that the probability is independent of the past history of 
detection. 
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We consider a number of alternative bases that have been previously analysed:19 
 fines on profits/ illegal gains:  ( ) ( )B p p c Q p   ;  
 fines on revenue: ( ) ( )RB p pQ p ; 
 fixed fines: 0( )FB p B .20 
Notice that each of these penalty bases is denominated in units of currency.  We 
will contrast all of these penalty bases with fines based on the overcharge.  The price-
overcharge is the extent to which price is raised above the "but-for" level. The overcharge 
can be expressed as the absolute increase in price, 0Np p    , in which case, in order 
to have a penalty base that is denominated in units of currency we have to multiply the 
overcharge,  , by some measure of output, and the natural one to use is the  “but-for” 
output, NQ . So the final penalty base we consider is  
 fines based on the overcharge:     ( ) N N NOB p p p Q p c Q    .21 
Within the framework of this model one could in principle obtain the first-best by 
imposing a Beckerian penalty -  i.e. a profit-based penalty implemented with toughness 
11 1        ‐ since that will deter all cartels. Indeed, as we will see, an overcharge-
based penalty imposed with the same degree of toughness will also achieve the first best 
since the optimal price of any cartel that does form will then be p c , and, anticipating 
this, all cartels will again be deterred.  However, the premise of this paper is that such 
first-best penalty rates of over 100% are unrealistic since there are other factors such as 
proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, insufficient legal ceilings, and competition 
authorities’ limited resources that come in to play in setting penalties.   With lower 
(second-best) penalty rates some cartels will form and will set positive overcharges, and 
the issue of what penalty base to use becomes very important bearing in mind its impact 
on both deterrence and price behaviour.  The characterisation of the second-best optimum 
taking account of the proportionality and other legal constraints but focusing on just price 
effects of formed cartels has been examined in the literature.22 In contrast to this literature 
here we recognise and take into account for the first time the effects of penalties on both 
                                                 
19 Note that in practice penalties also depend on the duration of the cartel.  In our analysis we are focusing 
on the steady-state penalties.  However, incorporating duration introduces a number of complications that 
make the analysis less tractable without fundamentally affecting the results.  For example we lose 
stationarity – see Harrington (2014), a paper that focuses on the implications of taking into account cartel 
duration. Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013) also recognise that competition authorities may detect a cartel either 
while it is still in existence or after it has fallen apart and show how this affects the optimal penalty rate.  
20 While the fixed fine is independent of the actual price, p,  charged by the cartel, it may vary across cases 
or across different markets. One may think of it as a penalty based on some measure of the size of the 
market, e.g. the revenue N Np Q earned at the “but-for” price.  
21 The same analysis holds, if we define overcharge as the percentage increase in price.   
22  See e.g. Houba, Motchenkova, Wen (2011, 2014). Harrington (2004, 2005) also looks at price effects of 
various penalty structures. 
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pricing behaviour and deterrence and then conduct an analysis that shows that provided 
penalties are in some sense equally tough, then whatever degree of toughness one 
chooses there is a clear welfare ranking of penalty bases: overcharge dominates profits, 
which in turn dominates revenue. 
We also assume that, so long as no firm has deviated, firms continue to collude even 
if they were detected and paid a fine - which is consistent with profit maximizing 
behaviour.23 
Given these assumptions the expected present value of profits (net of penalties) to a 
single firm from participating in the collusive agreement, when the penalty is imposed on 
base ( )B  with toughness τ, can be expressed as  
  ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ), ( )
(1 )
p c B p p c B pV p B
n
    
     ,            (1) 
where , 0 1    is the discount factor, and (1 )n     is what we call the intrinsic 
difficulty of holding the cartel together.  
If a firm defects from the collusive agreement in a particular period it sets a price 
( )Dp p p  that undercuts the cartel price and, for a single period, gets the entire industry 
profits at that lower price. Additionally, the defector incurs no penalty that would arise 
should the cartel be investigated and prosecuted in that period.24 However we assume that 
the other members of the cartel punish the defector by reverting to Nash behaviour for 
ever more.  The defector will wish to obtain the greatest profits it can, so, if the cartel sets 
a price above the monopoly price ( )Mp c  the defector will set the monopoly price, while, 
if the cartel sets a price at or below the monopoly price, the defector sets a price 
; 0, 0Dp p        that is as close as possible to the cartel price and so effectively 
takes the cartel profits.  So formally we have: 
    
( ), ( ) ( ), ( )
( , ) ; ( , )
, ( ) ( , ), ( )
M M M M
D D
M M
p c p p c c p p c
p p c p c
p p p c p c p p c
 
         
.        (2) 
                                                 
23 If a stable cartel could profitably form before the detection then, since nothing has changed after 
detection, it will continue to be profitable to collude.  A similar assumption that the cartel reestablishes 
after each conviction has been adopted in Motta and Polo (2003). However, other assumptions could be 
made.  For example Harrington (2004, 2005) assumes that a cartel ceases to exist after detection. More 
generally Houba, Motchenkova and Wen (2012, 2015) assume that, after detection, there is a constant 
probability , 0 1    that the cartel will continue in existence after detection. In this case one simply 
replaces the term (1 )n     that appears in our analysis with the more general expression 
(1 )(1 ) 1 .
1
n
   
      
 However, for the issues with which we are dealing, nothing of 
substance is affected by this, so in what follows we will continue to assume that all cartels re-form after 
detection (i.e. 1  ).   
24As in Motta and Polo (2003), we assume that price-deviating firms will not be prosecuted. Alternative 
assumptions are examined in Spagnolo (2004), Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007), Chen and Rey (2012), 
Jansen and Sorgard (2014). However, adopting these different assumptions would not change the main 
conclusion of our paper about superiority of overcharge-based penalties, i.e. price effects remain similar. 
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For a cartel to be stable it is necessary that 
    ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )Dp c B p p c p c      .         (3) 
We define the maximum critical difficulty, , as the value of Δ at which the cartel 
stability condition just holds. Notice that if there is no antitrust enforcement, i.e. 0  , 
then the cartel stability condition just reduces to 1  , and we have the standard result 
that 1 . When there is enforcement, i.e. 0  , it will be more difficult to keep a given 
cartel together and the maximum critical level of difficulty falls, so we will have 1  . In 
the rest of the paper we confine attention to the values of   in the range  0,1 , which is 
the range over which cartels would exist in the absence of a competition authority. So we 
will use this range as a baseline relative to which we compare the effects of different 
penalty regimes. In the next section we will explore precisely how   varies both within 
and across penalty regimes, and in particular how it varies with the toughness of the 
penalty regime, τ. 
When 0,     a stable cartel exists and we assume that the cartel sets a price that 
maximises the expected present value of profits,  , ( )V p B   subject to the stability 
condition (3).  As we will show, for some penalty regimes there may be values of 
0,     for which the cartel stability condition bites, so the cartel price can potentially 
vary with Δ over this interval.  So for all 0,     we formally define the cartel price as 
  ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ), ( ) arg max   subject to ( , )C D
p
p c B p p c B pp B p c              (4) 
An immediate conclusion which provides insight into why the cartel price is above or 
below the monopoly price in the different regimes is: 
 
Lemma 1 When the stability condition does not bite 
 , (.) ( ) ( ) 0C M Mp B p c B p c        . 
Proof: This follows immediately from the analysis of the value function derivative in (1):   
 , (.) ( )C Mp B p c    iff     ( ) 0 ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 0M M M MV p c p c B p c or B p c        . ■ 
 This provides an insight into the properties that any penalty base has to satisfy in 
order to have the property that the price set by those cartels that do form is below the 
monopoly price they would have set in the absence of any antitrust enforcement.  
To get an overall picture of the impact of a penalty regime on both deterrence and the 
price set by those cartels that do form, we consider all values of  0,1  and define 
what we call the overall price  , ( )p B   as  
10 
 
      , ( ) , 0,, ( )
, ,1
C
N
p B
p B
p c

                
.          (5) 
Then, assuming that Δ is uniformly distributed on [0,1], we can use (5) to calculate 
the average overcharge; the average consumer surplus; the average total welfare25 
associated with any penalty regime.  
Our objective is to understand how various penalty regimes as characterised by the 
toughness of the penalty, τ, and the penalty base ( )B p  affect: (a) cartel 
stability/deterrence as captured by 1  ; (b) the price,  , ( )Cp B   set by those stable 
cartels that form when 0,    . From this we can derive the impact of these regimes 
on the overall price  , ( )p B  and, hence, on average overcharge, average, consumer 
surplus and average total welfare.  
 
3. Cartel Pricing, Cartel Stability and Welfare 
 
The existing literature has not examined the implications of antitrust penalties for 
cartel stability in a systematic manner. In this section we fill in this gap by deriving the 
impact of each of the four alternative types of fine structures identified above on cartel 
pricing and on cartel stability (by which we mean the maximum critical difficulty of 
holding a cartel together). We combine these into a number of measures of 
overall/average welfare.  We index the four penalty bases by  , , ,b F R O  and allow 
the possibility that the penalty rate, ρ, and hence toughness, τ differs depending on which 
base is used.   
 
3.1. Penalty on Profits and Fixed Penalty 
Here the penalty base is  ( ) ( )B p p c Q p   , so if the toughness of this regime is 
 the stability condition (3) becomes 
   1 ( ) ( ), ( ) ( , )Dp c Q pV p B p c                           (6) 
 
Notice that in order for there to be any , (0)p c p P  , for which the cartel stability 
condition (6) holds it is necessary that 0 1  .   
                                                 
25 Recall that CS and welfare are defined by ( ) ( )   and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p
CS p Q z dz TW p CS p p c Q p

     
and,  for any p , (0)c p P  are strictly decreasing functions of p.  
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It clearly follows from (6) that maximizing the net present value of profits is 
equivalent to maximizing gross profits, and so to setting the monopoly price. 
Consequently the maximum critical difficulty under a profits-based penalty regime that is 
implemented with toughness , 0 1     is 
   1 1       .           (7) 
and so for those stable cartels that do form  - i.e. for 0 1     the cartel price is: 
      , arg max , ( ) ( )C M
p
p V p B p c        .26         (8) 
Thus fines based on profits/illegal gains induce the cartel to set the monopoly 
price ( )Mp c , independently of the toughness of the penalty regime.27 This is because the 
penalty just produces an equi-proportionate reduction in net expected profits.  So 
maximizing net profits is equivalent to maximizing gross profits and the price that is set  
is the same as that which would have arisen had no penalty regime been in place – the 
monopoly price. 
Combining the deterrence effect with the cartel pricing we obtain the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 1: When the penalty base is profit and the penalty is implemented with 
toughness  then: 
(a) the maximum critical level of difficulty is: 
     1      ;    
(b) for [0,1]  the overall price is: 
  ( ), 0 1,
, 1 1
Mp c
p
c

 

 
          
.           (9) 
 
The overall price is illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
                                                 
26This conclusion is consistent with the result in Lemma 1, since obviously, under a profit-based penalty 
regime  , ( ) 0C MB p B p c             . 
27 Houba et al. (2010) and Bageri et.al (2013) obtain similar results and Hunold (2013) obtains a similar 
result in a setting with upstream and downstream collusion. However, his analysis is different since he uses 
a static model without taking into account cartel stability condition. We go beyond Hunold (2013) static 
analysis by taking into account cartel stability and the deterrence effect of antitrust penalties (and not only 
price effect as is done in most of the existing literature). 
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Figure 1: Overall Price under Profits-Based Penalty 
 
Notice that if, for some reason – Cournot competition, product differentiation etc. 
- the but-for price were above marginal cost then illegal gains would be smaller than 
actual profits.  This will imply that under a penalty based on illegal gains the collusive 
price will be below that produced by a penalty on profits because the reduction in penalty 
is proportional to cartel output, so giving the cartel an incentive to expand output and 
lower price.28 However, because the overcharge-based penalty focuses directly on the 
distortion caused by cartel price-setting behaviour the intuition given above suggests that 
it will still outperform a penalty based on illegal gains. A thorough analysis of this more 
general setting remains an interesting research question. 
Finally, we show that a fixed penalty regime is effectively identical to a profit-
based regime. If there is some fixed monetary penalty 0B , then the expected present value 
of net profits is 0( ) ( )p c Q p B  . Maximising this would lead the cartel to set the 
monopoly price29 ( )Mp c  - essentially because the penalty operates like a fixed cost and so 
has no impact on pricing decisions, which are based on marginal costs.  From (2) the 
profits from defecting would therefore be the cartel/monopoly profits, and so the cartel 
stability condition (3) becomes 0( ) ( )
M
Mc B c    , i.e. 
01
( )M
B
c

   .  So any 
outcome that can be achieved by a profit-based regime with penalty rate   can be 
achieved by a fixed penalty 0 ( )
MB c  , and conversely any outcome that can be 
achieved by a fixed penalty regime can be achieved by a profits-based penalty regime 
implemented with toughness 0 / ( )
MB c   .  In what follows we will therefore ignore 
fixed penalty regimes and confine our attention solely to a comparison of profits-based 
penalty regimes, revenue-based regimes and overcharge-based regimes.   
                                                 
28We are grateful to Joe Harrington for helpful discussions on this issue. 
29Harrington (2005) shows that if the probability of detection and the penalty rate are constant then the 
same result holds in more general setting.  
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3.2. Penalty on Revenue 
If the penalty base is ( ) ( )RB p pQ p , and the penalty rate is R , i.e. R R  , 
the expected present value of net profits becomes 
 
   
 1 ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) 1
, ( ) .
R
R R
R R
cpQ p Q p
pQ p cQ p
V p B
 
                (10) 
 
So the effect of the penalty can be thought of in two ways: (i) it brings about an equi-
proportionate reduction in the cartel’s revenue – but leaves the cartel costs unaffected; or 
(ii) it raises the cartel’s costs and then imposes an equi-proportionate reduction in the 
resulting profits.  Either way it leads to a reduction in marginal revenue relative to costs 
and so a reduction in output below the monopoly output and a price above the monopoly 
price.30 In fact it follows immediately from optimization in (10) that, when the stability 
condition (3) is not binding, the unconstrained profit-maximizing cartel price is31 
arg max ( ) ( )
1 1
M M
pR R
c cp pQ p p c 
            
.                  (11)  
But then from (2) the defection price is ( )Mp c  and the defection profits are ( )M c .  So 
the stability condition (3) will not bite provided  
    
 1
1
( )
M
R
R M
c
c
   
      .        (12) 
So we have established: 
Proposition 2: When the penalty base is revenue and the penalty is implemented with 
toughness R then: 
(a) the maximum critical level of difficulty is: 
    
 1
1
1
( )
M
R
R
R R RM
c
c
   
        ;        (13) 
(b) for [0,1]  the overall price is: 
                                                 
30An alternative intuition as to why the cartel price is above the monopoly price is that  since marginal 
revenue at the monopoly output is positive, reducing output below this level will reduce the size of the 
expected penalty when the penalty is based on revenue. 
31Note that when the penalty base is revenue, ( ) ( ) 0M MRB p c cQ p c         , so this result is 
consistent with Lemma1. 
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   
 
, 0
1,
, 1
M
R R
RR R
R R
cp
p
c


               
.        (14) 
 
The overall price is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Overall Price under Revenue-Based Penalty 
 
 
3.3. Penalty on Overcharge 
If the penalty base is ( ) ( ) NOB p p c Q  , and the penalty rate is O ,i.e. O O  , 
then, from (1), the expected present value of net profits of  a cartel member is: 
      ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ), ( )
NN
OO
O O
p c Q p Qp c Q p p c QV p B
           .      (15) 
We want to know whether the cartel price is above or below the monopoly price 
and hence, from (2), what the defection price and profit will be. We begin by 
characterizing the profit-maximising price and output for the case where the stability 
condition does not bite. Formally, the unconstrained profit-maximizing price is given by 
   ˆ arg max ( ) ( ) ( )N MO O Opp p p c Q p c        .                    (16) 
Note that  ˆO Op   is defined implicitly by the condition ( ) 0NOp Q    , and so by 
standard comparative static arguments, will be a strictly decreasing function of O . 
However, for later purposes it helps to characterize the unconstrained price in a different 
way.  Let  
          ˆarg max ( ) ;NO O O O OO O
Q
Q P Q c Q Q p P Q          .            (17) 
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Define   ( ) ( ) ( ) NOMR Q P Q P Q Q Q    and notice that: 
 (i)  ( ) ( )NOQ Q MR Q P Q   ; 
 (ii)  ( ) ( )NOQ Q MR Q P Q    
(iii) ( ) ( )NOQ Q MR Q P Q   . 
Then the first-order condition for the maximisation in (17) is  
      OOMR Q c MC     .      
This is illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
Figure 3: Optimum Price and Output under Overcharge-Based Regime 
We then have 
Proposition 3: When there is an overcharge-based penalty regime implemented with 
toughness , 0 1O O   ,  then the unconstrained cartel price,  ˆO Op   satisfies : 
(a)  ˆ ( )MO Oc p p c  ;       (18) 
(b) 

0O
O
d p
d  .          (19) 
Proof:   Both (a) and (b) follow immediately from Figure 3.  ■ 
 
From (16) , (2) and (3) it follows that the cartel stability condition is  
    
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
N
Op c Q p Q p c Q p
        (20) 
Provided p c  and so the cartel sets a price above the but-for price, we can divide both 
sides of (20) by ( )p c  to obtain:   
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( )
1 1
N N
O OQ QQ p p P          
   (21) 
So, in order to maintain stability, the cartel may be constrained to keep its price 
below some maximum level (equivalently keep its output above some minimum level).32  
Therefore we have the following result:  
 
Proposition 4: When penalties are imposed on the overcharge then cartel stability 
requires that the cartel should not set the price above the maximum price  
    ( )
1
N
MAX O
O
Qp P       
.    (22) 
Corollary:  
(i) The maximum price is a strictly decreasing function of: (a) the toughness of 
the penalty regime, O ;(b) the difficulty of holding cartel together,  . 
(ii) Furthermore  
         ˆ0 ;   as  1MAX N MAXO O O O O Op P Q p p c         (23) 
Proof:   (i) This follows immediately from the fact the inverse demand function ( )P Q  is 
strictly decreasing, while the term 
1
N
O Q
 
 is increasing in both  and  O  . 
(ii) The first part of this statement follows from Figure 3, and the second from the 
fact that  NP Q c .   ■ 
        The intuition behind this result is simple. Suppose the cartel is just exactly on the 
cusp of stability, then an increase in   will, other things being equal, make the cartel 
unstable. The way to restore stability in the case of overcharge-based penalty is to reduce 
the penalty by cutting the price/overcharge. 
From (18) and (23)  it follows that there is a unique      , 0 1O OO O O        
such that  
         ˆ MAX OO O O Op p   .      (24) 
So, for   O O    the cartel stability condition will bite and the cartel will be forced to 
charge the maximum price. But then, from (23) in order for the cartel to be able to set a 
price above the “but-for” price, it is necessary that 1 O   .  Bringing this all together 
we have the following proposition. 
 
                                                 
32This result is similar to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) who made a general point that ICC will influence 
the cartel pricing decisions in the presence of random variations in profits. In contrast to Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1986) here the random variation comes from the penalty, while in their case it comes from 
fluctuations in demand. In our setting the random event is that the cartel is detected and it affects 
sustainability condition. Our intuition is similar, but the source of random variation is different. 
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Proposition 5: When there is an overcharge-based penalty regime that is implemented 
with toughness O  then: 
(a) the maximum critical level of difficulty is: 
      1O O O    ;     (25) 
(b) for [0,1]  the overall price is: 
 
    
    
ˆ , 0
, , 1
, 1 1
OO O O
MAX
OO O O O O
O
p
p p
c
 
  

               
.   (26) 
 
The overall price is illustrated in Figure 4 below 
 
 
Figure 4:  Overall Price under Overcharge-Based Penalty 
 
4. Comparisons of the Alternative Penalty Regimes 
 
In this section we draw on the results of the previous section to undertake an analysis of 
how the various welfare indicators in which we are interested – price, deterrence, average 
surplus etc. – are affected by the alternative penalty regimes, We investigate both within-
regime factors, such as toughness, but also the effect of switching to different penalty 
bases.   
 
4.1 Comparison of Prices Set by Stable Cartels 
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We start with a comparison across the three regimes of the prices set by those 
cartels that do form33 as established in Section 3 above.  We summarize the results in the 
following proposition:  
 
Proposition 6:  
(a) Penalties based on either profits (illegal gains) or on revenue are ineffective in 
reducing the cartel price below the monopoly price.  In particular: 
(i) With penalties on profits the cartel price remains equal to the monopoly 
price,  C Mp p c  and, moreover, is independent of the toughness of the 
profits-based regime  . 
(ii)  Penalties on revenue are distortionary and produce a cartel price that 
- lies between the monopoly price and the choke price – i.e. 
( ) (0)M CRp c p P  ; 
- is strictly increasing in the toughness of the revenue-based penalty 
regime, R . 
(b) Penalties on overcharges are effective in producing a cartel price that 
- lies between the monopoly and the competitive price – i.e. 
 C MOc p p c  ; 
- is a strictly decreasing function of the toughness of the overcharge 
regime O ; 
- tends towards the competitive price as 1O  . 
(c) For all , 0 1    , , 0 1R R    and , 0 1O O    
 C M C CO Rp p c p p   . 
  
The results in part (a)  of the proposition can be readily established formally by an 
inspection of equations (8), (11), and (14).  Their intuition is clear.  Whatever the degree 
of toughness, fines based on illegal gains just produce a proportional reduction in 
expected profits. Consequently, maximizing net profits is equivalent to maximizing gross 
profits and so leads the cartel to set the same price that would have prevailed had there 
been no enforcement.34 However, penalties based on revenue lower expected marginal 
revenue but do not affect marginal cost, thus inducing cartels to cut output and drive up 
                                                 
33Strictly speaking, for this comparison to be valid we have to assume 
     0 , ,R OR OMIN             
34As noted above this result depends on homogeneous goods assumption. If products are differentiated, the 
illegal gains penalty scheme will change the collusive value as well as tighten the ICC. This will reduce the 
overall cartel price below the monopoly price. 
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price.  Moreover, the tougher the penalty regime the greater the reduction in expected 
marginal revenue and consequently output and so the higher the price. 
 The results in part (b)  of the proposition can readily be established formally by an 
inspection of equations (16), (22), and (26). Intuitively, when penalties are based on the 
overcharge the quantity base is fixed at the but-for level and the penalty is just linear in 
price.  Thus there is an incentive for lowering price below the monopoly level as at that 
level a reduction in price will lower the fine by more than the gross profits (π(p)) – so net 
profits will increase.  
 Finally, parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 6 imply that, in relation to the prices35 set 
by stable cartels that form, we can get a clear ranking across the three penalty regimes 
that is independent of the precise degree of toughness of each regime.  This remarkably 
strong conclusion will be important in the analysis in Section 4.3 
 
4.2 Deterrence Effects: Comparative Static Properties 
The desirability of alternative penalty regimes depends not just on their effect on 
the price charged by any given cartel, but also on their effects on the number of cartels 
that are formed and remain stable - their effect on deterrence. In this sub-section we begin 
to examine these latter effects by undertaking a comparative static analysis of how the 
maximum critical difficulty of holding a cartel together is affected by the penalty regime 
and market conditions. We observe that for all three penalty regimes, the maximum 
critical difficulty of holding a cartel together is decreasing in the toughness of the penalty 
regime, and goes to zero as the degree of toughness goes to 1. This follows immediately 
from equations (7), (13) and (25) defining the maximum critical difficulty under all three 
regimes. 
 
4.3  Welfare Effects of Using Different Penalty Bases 
 Precisely because, as we have just seen, the deterrent effects of any given penalty 
regime is so sensitive to the toughness with which it is implemented, it follows that the 
overall price and hence the various measures of average consumer surplus etc. are also 
going to be very sensitive to the toughness with which any given regime is implemented. 
So using, say, revenue rather than the overcharge as a penalty base may produce better 
welfare outcomes if the revenue-based penalty is implemented very toughly while the 
overcharge-based penalty is implemented very weakly. Consequently if we want to 
undertake a meaningful analysis of the consequences for various indicators of welfare – 
price, deterrence etc.  -  of using different bases on which to impose penalties, we have to 
do so holding the degree of toughness constant in some sense.  There are a number of 
possible interpretations of what it might mean for regimes to be equally tough. In what 
follows we consider two: deterrence equivalence and penalty revenue equivalence.  
                                                 
35And hence the associated levels of consumer surplus and total welfare. 
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Recall also that using the expressions for overall cartel prices derived in sections 
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 and assuming that Δ is uniformly distributed on [0,1], we can calculate 
the average overcharge, the average consumer surplus, and the average total welfare 
associated with any penalty regime.  These are given by 
   1
0
( ) , ( )O B p B d c          (27)
   1
0
( ) , ( )CS B CS p B d           (28) 
   1
0
( ) , ( )TW B TW p B d          (29) 
In particular, by substituting (9) into (27) - (29) we obtain 
     , ,O CS TW        - the average overcharge, consumer surplus and total 
welfare under a profits-based regime that is implemented with toughness , 0 1    .  
By substituting (14) into (27)-(29) and obtain      , ,R R RR R RO CS TW    - the average 
overcharge, consumer surplus and total welfare under a revenue-based regime that is 
implemented with toughness , 0 1R R   . While, by substituting (26) into (27)-(29)  
we obtain      , ,O O OO O OO CS TW    - the average overcharge, consumer surplus and 
total welfare under an overcharge-based regime that is implemented with toughness 
, 0 1O O   . 
 
4.3.1. Deterrence Equivalence 
 One natural interpretation of what it might mean for each regime to be equally 
tough is that the fraction of cartels deterred is exactly the same across all three regimes – 
i.e. the maximum critical difficulty is the same across all three regimes.  Formally we 
require that the toughness parameters , ,R O    are such that, for some * *, 0 1     
          *R OR O          .   (30) 
If we denote the toughness parameters for which this is true by * * *, ,R O   , then 
clearly ** * 1O      and ** 1R    . But, from Proposition 8 this immediately 
implies: 
           
*
* * * * * *
, 0 :
, , , , , ,C C CO O O O R R R Rp p p p p p        
    
            (31) 
and 
     * * * *, 1: , , ,O O R Rp p p c                (32) 
 
This gives us the following proposition: 
21 
 
Proposition 7:  If we impose deterrent equivalence for any 
* *
, 0 1     then 
(i)      * * *O RO RO O O      
(ii)      * * *O RO RCS CS CS      
(iii)      * * *O RO RTW TW TW     . 
Proof:  (i) follows by using (31) and (32) and integrating over all [0,1] .  (ii) and (iii) 
follow by noting that consumer surplus and total welfare are strictly decreasing functions 
of price.  ■ 
 
Figure 5 shows the superiority of the overcharge based regime for overall prices 
under deterrence equivalence. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Overall Prices under Deterrence Equivalence 
 
 The intuition is simple. Profit or revenue based regimes could only perform better 
in terms of overall prices if the toughness parameters in these regimes led to cartel 
deterrence and thus competitive (Bertrand) pricing at even lower values of Δ (the critical 
difficulty of forming cartels) than the values of Δ that lead to deterrence and competitive 
pricing with the toughness parameter of the overcharge-based regime. Under deterrence 
equivalence the toughness parameters and the values of Δ above which we get deterrence 
and competitive pricing are equalized across the three regimes, so the overcharge regime 
leads unambiguously to lower overall prices. As Proposition 7 shows, whatever welfare 
indicator we use, an overcharge-based penalty regime welfare dominates a profit-based 
regime which in turn welfare dominate a revenue-based penalty regime. 
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 We also have the following simple corollary relating to the comparison of an 
overcharge-based penalty regime with  a profits-based regime.  
 
Corollary 8: If an overcharge-based regime is at least as tough as a profit-based 
regime then it welfare dominates the profit-based regime.  Formally, for all 
 , 0 1O O        
(i)    O OO O   ; 
(ii)    O OCS CS   ; 
(iii)    O OTW TW    . 
Proof:  From (26) and (9) it follows that , 0 1      , 
     , , MO Op p p c      ,  while , 1 1     ,     , ,O Op p c      . 
So (i) follows by integration over [0,1] ;  (ii) and (iii) follow by noting that consumer 
surplus and total welfare are strictly decreasing functions of price.  ■ 
  
4.3.2 Penalty Revenue Equivalence 
 An alternative notion of equal toughness is that of penalty revenue equivalence, 
namely that, on average36 the size of the penalty actually paid by any cartel that forms 
and is subsequently detected and penalized should be the same whatever penalty base is 
in operation.  There are two related reasons for considering such a criterion.   
The first is the obvious one that, since we are using different bases, which, in any 
given case could be of a different size – e.g. profit will be lower than revenue – then 
imposing a penalty at, say, 50% on one base will produce a very different revenue than 
imposing a penalty at 50% on the other.  So rather than just comparing the rates at which 
various  penalties are imposed, it makes sense to correct for the difference in the size of 
the bases by requiring that the absolute amount of penalty revenue raised is the same. 
The second reason is that competition authorities and, especially, courts are not 
just interested in deterrence. They care about factors such as proportionality and so may 
not want convicted cartels to end up paying massively different fines just because a 
different base is used on which to impose penalties. 
Unfortunately, general analysis of revenue equivalence, without specifying a 
particular demand function, is not feasible. So for a comparison of the effects of different 
penalty structures under penalty revenue equivalence we assume a linear demand 
structure. In that case, results 9, 10 below can be obtained. For detailed proofs see 
Katsoulacos et al. (2015).  
                                                 
36Since, as indicated, the price set by any cartel that does form, under both a revenue-based penalty regime 
and an overcharge-based penalty regime will potentially vary depending on the intrinsic difficulty of 
holding the cartel together, so will the actual penalty paid.   So all we can require is that on average the 
penalty paid should be the same.   
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To simplify the exposition we first compare an overcharge-based regime with a 
profit-based regime and then we compare a profit-based regime with a revenue-based 
regime. 
 
4.3.2.1 Overcharge vs Profits 
Suppose that an overcharge-based penalty regime is implemented with toughness 
, 0 1O O   , and so, for any cartel that is detected and penalized, generates on 
average37 the penalty revenue    1 001. ,1
O
N
CO
O O O
O
QF p c d
  
        .  While the 
penalty revenue generated under the profit-based regime is given by 
  ( ) ( )M MF c c        , which is directly proportional to the toughness of the 
profits-based penalty regime.38 
If we let  e O  denote the toughness of the profits-based penalty regime that is 
penalty revenue equivalent to O  then this is defined by the condition: 
   0e O OF F        
which under linear demand structure specified in Katsoulacos et al. (2015) implies: 
   
      2 1 2 ln 2 ln(1 )1e OO O O OO
           .  (33) 
However, because  O OF  is inverse U-shaped with   0  as  1O O OF     so too will 
be  e O  .  In other words because a very tough overcharge based regime will erode the 
penalty base and drive penalty revenue to zero as 1O  , if the only condition we 
imposed for revenue equivalence was (33) we would end up comparing extremely tough 
overcharge-based regimes with extremely weak profit-based regimes, which would 
violate our requirement that these regimes are equally tough.  So the second condition we 
impose to ensure equal toughness is that we confine attention to values of  0,1O   for 
which  e O   is monotonic increasing.39 
                                                 
37Because the overcharge varies with the critical level of difficulty  0, R     so too will the 
precise penalty revenue obtained, so all we can determine is the average penalty revenue.  
38Note that it is equal to the average fine that is paid by any cartel that is detected and penalized. 
39It is straightforward to show that this restriction implies 0.465, 0.427O    .  Following the 
work of Bryant and Eckard (1991), it is widely accepted that in practice the annual probability of detection 
is about 15% .  However, it is plausible to assume that the time it takes cartel members to spot a deviation 
and react to it by implementing the grim trigger strategy is less than a year. The relevant per period 
probability of detection is that of being detected over this much shorter interval of time, and so the relevant 
value of β is < 0.15 (see also Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) or Harrington and Wei (2014)). The 
discussion in Section 1 suggests that the maximum penalty rate that is ever likely to be imposed on profits 
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  Having defined  e O   we can use (27) – (29) to define  
     0 0 0, ,e e eO CS TW                     which are, respectively the average 
overcharge, consumer surplus and total welfare that would accrue under a profits-based 
regime that was implemented with  a degree of toughness that is penalty-revenue 
equivalent to the degree of toughness O  with which the overcharge-based penalty 
regime is implemented.  We then have the following result. 
 
Result 9: If we impose penalty-revenue equivalence then under a linear demand 
structure: 
(i)    eO O OO O        
(ii)    eO O OCS CS        
(iii)    eO O OTW TW        
Proof:  For detailed proofs see Appendix 2 in Katsoulacos et al. (2015). 
 So in terms of all our welfare criteria an overcharge-based penalty regime welfare 
dominates a profits-based regime that is implemented with a penalty-revenue-equivalent 
degree of toughness.40 
 
4.3.2.2   Profits vs Revenue 
Note that under a revenue-based regime the average penalty that is paid by any 
cartel that is detected and penalized is given by 
    
1 1
M MR
R R
R R
c cF p Q p   
               
   
Similar to section 4.3.3.1 we let  e R   denote the toughness of the profits-based 
penalty regime that is penalty revenue equivalent to R  then this is defined by the 
condition: 
   0e R RF F        
Now because under the linear demand structure specified in Katsoulacos et al. 
(2015)  R RF  is inverse U-shaped with  0 0;RF    0  as  1R R RF    so too will 
                                                                                                                                                 
is 200%.  Taken together this implies that in practice 0.3     and so restricting attention to the 
range of values for which  e O   is monotonic increasing is fully consistent with the range of values for 
the toughness of profits-based regimes that we see in practice. 
40 As discussed in Katsoulacos et al. (2015), switching from a profit to an overcharge-based regime could 
well involve some balancing of the desire to achieve revenue equivalence and deterrence equivalence. 
Proposition 11 of that paper generalizes the Result 9 above showing that however one chooses to strike this 
balance the switch is unambiguously welfare improving.  
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be  e R  .  So, just as in the previous sub-section, the second condition we impose to 
ensure equal toughness is that we confine attention to values of  0,1R   for which 
 e R   is monotonic increasing. 
 Having defined  e R   we can use (27) – (29) to define  
     , ,e e eR R RO CS TW                     which are, respectively the average 
overcharge, consumer surplus and total welfare that would accrue under a profits-based 
regime that was implemented with  a degree of toughness that is penalty-revenue 
equivalent to the degree of toughness R  with which the revenue-based penalty regime is 
implemented.  Hence, we  have the following powerful result: 
 
Result 10: If we impose penalty-revenue equivalence then, under a linear demand 
structure: 
(i)    eR R RO O        
(ii)    eR R RCS CS        
(iii)    eR R RTW TW        
Proof:  For detailed proofs see Appendix 3 in Katsoulacos et al. (2015). 
  
So in terms of all our welfare criteria a revenue-based penalty regime is 
unambiguously dominated by a profits-based regime that is implemented with a penalty-
revenue-equivalent degree of toughness.   
The overall conclusion that emerges given these results is that whether one uses 
deterrence equivalence or penalty-revenue equivalence as a way of equating the degree of 
toughness of the various regimes, an overcharge-based regime welfare dominates a 
profits-based regime which in turn welfare dominates a revenue-based regime.   
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
We analyze the impact of various antitrust penalty regimes on: (i) the price charged by 
any given cartel; (ii) cartel stability; and finally, (iii) the overall level of consumer and 
total welfare induced by the different regimes. 
For this analysis we use a repeated Bertrand oligopoly model that allows us to 
compare both the price and the deterrence effects of the four major types of fining 
structures. These four types include fines based on revenues, fines based on illegal gains, 
fines based on the cartel overcharge, and fixed fines. Further, we show that when 
penalties are introduced on either revenue or on the cartel overcharge then the cartel 
stability condition can influence the price set by the cartel. The general point that ICC 
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will influence the pricing decisions in the presence of random variations in profits has 
been made in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). In contrast to Rotemberg and Saloner 
(1986) here random variation comes from the expected penalty, while in their case it 
comes from fluctuations in demand. The proposed novel framework allows us to bridge 
the standard critical discount factor approach to the analysis of collusion (see e.g. Tirole 
(1988) or Motta and Polo (2003)) to profit-maximizing decisions by the cartel members 
(with continuum of prices, which can be chosen by the cartel). This latter approach has 
been proposed in e.g. Block et al. (1981) or Harrington (2004, 2005). 
While other papers have considered the properties of the four penalty regimes and 
made some limited comparisons between them, the contribution of this paper is to 
undertake a systematic comparison of all four regimes in terms of both the prices set by 
those cartels that form and on cartel stability (deterrence) and hence the number of cartels 
that form. We examine deterrence under both deterrence equivalence and penalty-
revenue equivalence. 
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that there is absolutely no support from welfare 
economics for the currently widely utilized fining structures (mainly based on revenues). 
Penalties based on overcharges are welfare superior to all three other penalty structures 
considered in this paper. There are other penalty bases that could be considered.  
However to the extent that these involve a combination of the penalty bases considered 
here – for example a fixed penalty combined with an overcharge-based penalty – then, 
the welfare outcomes are likely to be a combination of the welfare outcomes under each 
of the component terms in the penalty base and so will not produce higher welfare levels 
than a pure overcharge-based regime – provided of course that, as here, the comparison is 
done imposing a condition of equal toughness.   
We have confined attention to linear penalty structures.  The extension of our analysis 
to non-linear penalty structures remains an interesting research direction.  
While it has not been our main purpose in this paper to go into issues of 
implementation of an alternative penalty regime based on overcharges there are a number 
of points that should be made. First, developments in economics and econometrics make 
it possible to estimate overcharges from a cartel infringement with reasonable precision 
or confidence, as is regularly done to assess damages. Second, the question of which 
penalty regime to implement must be answered taking into account both relative welfare 
levels induced under each regime and the relative costs of implementation. Third, to the 
extent that parties engage in private damage claims the costs of calculating the but-for 
price are already being incurred by society, and there may be some gains in avoiding 
duplication by having competition authorities perform the calculation in order to assess 
the appropriate overcharge penalty.  Fourth, there could be further cost reductions by 
requiring firms to contribute to the costs of gathering reliable data required to perform the 
calculations of the but-for price and output.41 
                                                 
41We are grateful to Giancarlo Spagnolo for pointing this out to us.  
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To paraphrase the position already expressed recently in another paper it is probably 
time to change the distortive policies currently utilized - that make revenue so central for 
calculating fines, if the only thing the welfare costs of the distortions buy for us is saving 
the costs of data collection and overcharges estimation.42 
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